Fairewinds Introduces a Japanese Language Edition and Identifies Safety Problems in all Reactors Designed Like Fukushima from Fairewinds Associates on Vimeo.

While, here at home, a recent fire in the office of Vermont Yankee has both sides of the relicensing controversy eyeing each other suspiciously; in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, the NRC has just released a report detailing concerns about those other Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactors, which are identical to the one operating at VY.

In a new video analysis that appeared simultaneously on the brand new fairewinds.jp Japanese site, Arnie Gundersen of Fairewinds Associates discusses three key issues that were neatly excluded from the NRC report .

These include fatal design flaws in the Mark 1 BWR containment which were identified long ago.

It is apparent from NRC correspondence dating back as far as the early ’70’s, not long after the Mark 1 had been put into widespread use, that they became aware of the problems in a timely manner.

In the case of  the Mark 1 “pressure suppression containment,” which was recognized to be ineffective, the NRC chose not to impose an outright ban on the design because to do so might curtail the prospects of a nascent nuclear industry.  

When it was later discovered that hydrogen build-up could cause an explosion, the industry was allowed to make a voluntary modification, adding a vent that was supposed to alleviate the problem.  As Arnie points out, by “proactively” making the modification on a “voluntary” basis, the industry excused itself from scrutiny it would have undergone from both public and regulatory inquisitors, had the NRC acted to make the modification compulsory.

Before the Fukushima accident, neither the vents nor the containment had ever been tested.  At Fukushima, they were tested three times and failed.

Another design issue raised by Fukushima but ignored in the NRC report, is the location of the control rods in the bottom of the reactor rather than at the top where they are located in pressurized water reactors.  

To  put it simply, this effectively makes the reactor bottom a sieve, with sixty drill holes into which hollow metal tubing has been inserted.  If, in the event of an accident, the core melts,  how long do you think it takes for those hollow metal tubes to dissolve, leaving sixty convenient down-spouts through which molten core can flow?

By contrast, in pressurized water reactors, with their top-loaded control rods, the bottom of the reactor vessel is thick, solid and uninterrupted.

So…one more reason why it’s crazy to allow those Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactors to continue operating…right?

Not if you’re crunching numbers in a computerized cost/benefit analysis model that has, itself, a fatal flaw.

… And this is what it appears the NRC has been doing!  

Watch the video; you won’t be sorry.  Or maybe, you will.