You're familiar with the argument about Anthony Pollina's candidacy, and whether he should get the support of the Democratic Party without running in the Democratic primary. His supporters point out that the law prohibits him from appearing on more than one party's primary ballot, so that if he runs in the Prog primary, which has been his home party for many years, he can't run in the D primary.

Here's the legislative provision of Title 17 in question:

§ 2353. Petitions to place names on ballot

(b) A person's name shall not be listed as a candidate on the primary ballot of more than one party in the same election.

 In the absence of this statutory provision, a candidate could decide to enter the P and D primaries, or even more, and run on all the tickets in which he or she won the primary.

The question I would like to raise today is: Would this be a good idea? Should we try to get the Legislature to repeal this provision of law? Are there harmful effects of this change that we would want to pay attention to before we pushed for a change like this?

On the face of it this change seems to make sense to me. On the other hand, I know there are people who pay a lot more to the mechanics and theory of elections and ballots than I do, so other people may have a more informed analysis than mine. 

Pollina:  Pure or Progressive? 

If Anthony Pollina, or any other candidate challenging the incumbent Republican Governor, cannot win the Democratic primary in September, forget about winning the general election in November. 

The Democratic primary is the only contest that will allow one of the potentially serious gubernatorial challengers to clear the field for a clear shot at Jim Douglas. Mr. Pollina cannot expect to beat Jim Douglas – AND another left/liberal/progressive candidate – by waiting until November to face the voters for the first time.  If he is unable to make his case to the progressive/liberal/left voters in September, then a wait-till-November campaign will be nothing but a vanity race that takes himself far more seriously than his campaign.

Mr. Pollina, don’t waste our time, our money or effort in November if you cannot make your case in September. It's that simple.  It may not be the best way (for you, not the left you claim to represent), it may not be the fair way (to you, not the voters), it may not be the preferred way (for you, not progressive voters), but it really is that simple.

For Anthony Pollina, or whoever wins the Democratic primary, there is a great opportunity too.  The opportunity to run against an incumbent Republican Governor whose popularity is sagging after winning and holding the unified banner of the left. It is a recipe for victory, and it is the only path to victory.

If Anthony Pollina runs (à la Bernie Sanders 2006) in the Democratic primary, he has a chance of beating Jim Douglas. He can win the governor’s office, but he will win it only by clearing the field in September and then taking the consolidated Progressive/Democratic block into the November election.

If Anthony Pollina runs (à la Ralph Nader 2000), then he has no chance of becoming governor. Jim Douglas will win a plurality or even a majority by default, apathy or inertia.

[This post is part I on the practical, mechanical and some historical context of the 2008 gubernatorial Progressive/Democratic primary election decision. Tomorrow in part II, I'll post on the politics of Anthony Pollina's decision]

After the jump, why the Democratic primary is the only path to the Governor's office for a Progressive/Democratic candidate.

We do not need to look back too far to see what is coming. There are two well-trodden paths for Mr. Pollina to follow. The question for 2008 is, will we see:

the “2006 Bernie Sanders” winning version of Anthony Pollina?

– or –

the “2000 Ralph Nader” spoiler version of Anthony Pollina?

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

In 2002, Mr. Pollina split the Progressive/Democratic vote approximately 40/60 with Peter Shumlin. That voting bloc represented almost 3 in 5 votes cast that year. Mr. Pollina's campaign strategy assured that Brian (“Mr. 41%”) Dubie became Lt. Governor despite an overwhelming 59-41 liberal/progressive preference over a squeek-under-the-door-Republican “winner.”

Today, Mr. Pollina is once again threatening the Progressive/Democratic block of voters that he will lose yet another election, in 2002 fashion, in November 2008.  It is no secret that he is trying to scare off a Democratic candidate from the fate of being pulled down with him.  Any serious Democratic challenger will weigh heavily the implications of wasting months and money for the privilege of being torpedoed by a less-than-serious vanity crusade and an end run around the only primary available to the left's voters.

If he is serious about running for Governor, Mr. Pollina will make the same correction in tactics that Senator Sanders made in 2006. Senator Sanders won the Democratic primary (w/ 94% of the vote in a four-way Democratic primary race, i.e., one Congressman vs. three putative Democratic pygmies). This was the first time in 24 years of statewide campaigns that Senator Sanders petitioned to be on the Democratic primary ballot. Even though he later declined the Democratic nomination after winning it, the formula paid dividends nicely.

Consider this —
In 1988, Congressman Jim Jeffords' soon to be vacated congressional seat was Burlington Mayor Bernie Sanders’ for the taking. All Bernie had to do was accept a victory in the Democratic primary. At the time, he was a successful and popular Burlington Mayor who ran a losing but energetic and inspiring Gubernatorial campaign two years earlier against incumbent Madeleine Kunin and Republican Peter Smith. Mayor Sanders had a Democratic primary nomination and a congressional seat with his name on it, if he could just get over the thought of petitioning to be on the September primary ballot.

Conversely, in 1988, Jim Jeffords’ soon to be vacated congressional seat was a known GOP hold if Bernie Sanders chose purity and politics over pragmatism and the progressive cause. What did he do? Well, rather than accept the Democratic primary nomination and a seat in Congress, Mayor Sanders accepted an 8,000 vote defeat at the hands of a 41% land-sliding Republican, Peter Smith. I still weep each time I read it. I still weap each time I read it. (warning pdf).

In 1988, Mayor Sanders chose not to vie for the Democratic nomination.  The voters of Vermont awarded, and split, 57% of their vote between two liberal candidates.  A grateful Peter Smith (R-VT) skated to Congress with less than a static baseline 41% of the GOP vote. Smith skated simply because a popular and well-known Burlington Mayor could not find it in himself to consolidate the liberal/progressive left voting bloc and accept the Democratic nomination. Mayor Sanders became Congressman Sanders in 1990, but only with an open and consolidated field on the left. With no Democratic-Independent/Progressive vote to split, Mayor Sanders was the one who coasted into Congress as Peter Smith received essentially the same vote (40%) in 1990 as he did in 1988.

The difference two years made: 1990 was a two-person race between Bernie Sanders and Peter Smith. There was no Democratic-Progressive vote to split for the benefit of the Republican incumbent.  Bernie garnered 56% of the vote – the exact same voters who split two years earlier in 1988 between the Independent Mayor and the Democratic nominee, while Peter Smith stayed static at 40%.

Fast forward.  The dynamic does not change but the stakes in 2006 were as high as they have ever been. Vermont had two open and contested congressional races. Congressman Sanders was not going to risk a repeat of his 8,000-vote loss in 1988 to a 41% Republican. With every Senate seat a critical race, there was no point in risking a nominal Democratic nominee siphoning a few nominal percentage points. Worse still, a senate seat was most certainly not worth taking the risk that a serious Democrat, albeit with no serious chance of winning, might siphon 10% or 20% points off the p/Progressive & Democratic vote in November.

To win, Congressman Sanders therefore dispatched any puritanical scruples about contaminating himself with the great unwashed vying for the Democratic nomination (and considering the field in 2006, that characterization is kind). Party purity did not seem so important when there was an office to be won rather than a personal scruples (which were totally irrelevant to voters in the first place) to uphold. Congressman Sanders wisely chose to run a purely progressive race; he ran a substantive issue oriented campaign that drew a clear distinction between his progressive values and those of his callow GOP Bush-enabling opponent. Senator Sanders’ campaign overflowed with substance, which overshadowed his participation in the (whew) Democratic primary.

In 2006, Bernie Sanders was serious about winning. In 2006, Bernie Sanders, who had never before petitioned to put himself on the ballot as a Democrat, did so for the sake of his constituents, for the sake of his campaign and to make sure he would win. It was the only reasonable choice; in fact, it was a requirement to insure that he would advance the progressive agenda into the Senate.

The dynamic has not changed in two years or twenty years.  Only the office and some of the players. Mr. Pollina has been down this road before and we've seen what happened to him we know what will happen if he runs a wait-till-November to consolidate the Progressive/Democratic voter. 

If Anthony Pollina cannot or will not run in the September primary, he is not a serious candidate. Period.

[Tomorrow, the political factors of Mr. Pollina's decision and why he, or any other winner of the September Democratic primary, is in a great position to win the gubernatorial contest]